Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94075
Authors: 
Mylovanov, Tymofiy
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 130
Abstract: 
This paper provides an explanation for the frequently observed phenomenon of 'inefficient micromanagement'. I show that a supervisor may get comprehensively involved into activities of a subordinate although a better option of delegation is available. This inefficiency persists in the absence of conflict of preferences and even as the cost of delegation becomes zero. The paper also demonstrates that imposing constraints on communication with a subordinate can be beneficial for a superior.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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