Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94072
Authors: 
Hörisch, Hannah
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 230
Abstract: 
We implement the Rawlsian veil of ignorance in the laboratory. Our experimental design allows separating the effects of risk and social preferences behind the veil of ignorance. Subjects prefer more equal distributions behind than in front of the veil of ignorance, but only a minority acts according to maximin preferences. Men prefer more equal allocations mostly for insurance purposes, women also due to social preferences for equality. Our results contrast the Utilitarian's claim that behind the veil of ignorance maximin preferences necessarily imply infinite risk aversion. They are compatible with any degree of risk aversion as long as social preferences for equality are sufficiently strong.
Subjects: 
law and economics
incentives
crowding out
experiment
JEL: 
D63
D64
C99
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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