Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94070
Authors: 
Ke, Changxia
Konrad, Kai A.
Morath, Florian
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 420
Abstract: 
Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. This paper presents an experiment on the determinants of whether alliances break up and fight internally after having defeated a joint enemy. First, if peaceful sharing yields an asymmetric rent distribution, this increases the likelihood of fighting. In turn, anticipation of the higher likelihood of internal fight reduces the alliance's ability to succeed against the outside enemy. Second, the option to make non-binding declarations on non-aggression in the relationship between alliance members does not make peaceful settlement within the alliance more likely. Third, higher differences in the alliance players' contributions to alliance effort lead to more internal conflict and more intense fighting.
Subjects: 
Conflict
Contest
Alliance
Endogenous internal conflict
Hold-up problem
Non-aggression pact
Experiment
JEL: 
D72
D74
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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