Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94064
Authors: 
Ding, Wei
Jeitschko, Thomas D.
Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 261
Abstract: 
In a recurring auction early bids may reveal bidders' types, which in turn affects bidding in later auctions. Bidders take this into account and may bid in a way that conceals their private information until the last auction is played. The present paper analyzes the equilibrium of a sequence of ?rst-price auctions assuming bidders have stable private values. We show that signal-jamming occurs and explore the dynamics of equilibrium prices.
Subjects: 
Auctions
Signaling
Price Competition
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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