Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/94051 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 351
Verlag: 
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), München
Zusammenfassung: 
A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a short-listed set. Items are differentiated by observable quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. Money does not enter the buyer's objective function, but only his constraints. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. We derive the Bayesian optimal mechanism for the buyer's problem. We ?nd that simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers are optimal. Hence, somewhat surprisingly, ex-postcompetition is not required to implement optimality. Finally, we discuss the problem in a detail free setting.
Schlagwörter: 
Mechanism Design
Subsidies
Budget
Procurement
Knapsack Problem
JEL: 
D21
D44
D45
D82
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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