Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94051
Authors: 
Ensthaler, Ludwig
Giebe, Thomas
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 351
Abstract: 
A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a short-listed set. Items are differentiated by observable quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. Money does not enter the buyer's objective function, but only his constraints. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. We derive the Bayesian optimal mechanism for the buyer's problem. We ?nd that simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers are optimal. Hence, somewhat surprisingly, ex-postcompetition is not required to implement optimality. Finally, we discuss the problem in a detail free setting.
Subjects: 
Mechanism Design
Subsidies
Budget
Procurement
Knapsack Problem
JEL: 
D21
D44
D45
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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