Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/94045 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 302
Verlag: 
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), München
Zusammenfassung: 
Consider a situation where person A undertakes acostly action that benefits person B. This behavior seems altruistic. However, if A expects a reward in return from B, then A's action may be motivated by expected rewards rather than by pure altruism. The question we address in this experimental study is how B reacts to A's intentions. We vary the probability that the second mover in a trust game can reciprocate and analyze effects on second mover behavior. Our results suggest that expected rewards do not spoil the perceived kindness of an action and the action's rewards.
Schlagwörter: 
social preferences
intentions
beliefs
psychological game theory
experiment
JEL: 
D03
D64
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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