Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94030
Authors: 
Li, Jianpei
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 210
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the efficiency of team production when agents exhibit other regarding preferences. It is shown that full efficiency can be sustained as an equilibrium through a budget-balancing mechanism that punishes some randomly chosen agents if output falls short of efficient level but distributes the output equally otherwise, provided that the agents are sufficiently inequity averse.
Subjects: 
moral hazard
team production
inequity aversion
JEL: 
C7
D7
D63
L2
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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