Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93992
Authors: 
Gürtler, Oliver
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 100
Abstract: 
In this paper, we consider a symmetric rent-seeking contest, where employees lobby for a governmental contract on behalf of firms. The only verifiable information is which firm is assigned the contract. We derive the optimal wage contracts of the employees and analyze, whether commitment by determining the wage contract prior to the competitor is profitable. This is indeed the case, i.e. firms prefer to move first in the wage-setting subgame. This complements previous work on rent-seeking contests emphasizing that commitment via rent-seeking expenditures is unprofitable in symmetric contests.
Subjects: 
Contest
First-Mover Advantage
Commitment
Wage Contract
JEL: 
D72
M52
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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