Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/93986 
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 9
Publisher: 
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), München
Abstract: 
Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004: We model the formation of a herd as a game between a predator and a prey population. The predator receives some information about the composition of the herd when he chases it, but receives no information when he chases a solitary individual. We describe situations in which the herd and its leader are in conflict and in which the leader bows to the herd's wish but where this is not to the benefit of the herd.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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