Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93979
Authors: 
Flåm, Sjur Didrik
Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 321
Abstract: 
Car owners are liable for property damage inflicted on other motorists. In most countries such liability must be insured by law. That law may favor expensive or heavy vehicles, prone to suffer or inflict large losses. This paper explores links between liability rules and vehicle choice. It presumes cooperative insurance, but non-cooperative acquisition of vehicles. Thus, the Nash equilibrium and its degree of efficiency depend on the liability regime.
Subjects: 
liability
mutual insurance
core
pure Nash equilibrium
anonymous games
non-atomic measure
JEL: 
C71
C72
D61
K13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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