Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93973
Authors: 
Herbst, Luisa
Konrad, Kai A.
Morath, Florian
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 419
Abstract: 
We study endogenous group formation in tournaments employing experimental three-player contests. We find that players in endogenously formed alliances cope better with the moral hazard problem in groups than players who are forced into an alliance. Also, players who are committed to expending effort above average choose to stand alone. If these players are forced to play in an alliance, they invest even more, whereas their co-players choose lower effort. Anticipation of this exploitation may explain their preference to stand alone.
Subjects: 
Endogenous group formation
contest
conflict
alliance
experiment
moral hazard problem
free-riding
in-group favoritism
JEL: 
D72
D74
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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