Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93926
Authors: 
Staal, Klaas
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 187
Abstract: 
This paper studies the equilibrium size of countries. Individuals in small countries have greater influence over the nature of political decision making while individuals in large countries have the advantage of more public goods and lower tax rates. The model implies that (i) there exists excessive incentives to separate, though this need not be the case for all sets of secession rules studied; (ii) an exogenous increase in public spending decreases country size; (iii) countries with a presidential-congressional democracy are larger than countries with a parliamentary democracy.
Subjects: 
country size
public spending
structure of government
JEL: 
D7
H1
H2
H7
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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