Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/93923 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 426
Verlag: 
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), München
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the effects of improvements in market transparency on eBay on seller exit and continuing sellers' behavior. An improvement in market transparency by reducing strategic bias in buyer ratings led to a significant increase in buyer valuation especially of sellers rated poorly prior to the change, but not to an increase in seller exit. When sellers had the choice between exiting'€”a reduction in adverse selection'€”and improved behavior'€”a reduction in moral hazard'€”, they preferred the latter because of lower cost. Increasing market transparency improves on market outcomes.
Schlagwörter: 
Anonymous markets
adverse selection
moral hazard
reputation building mechanisms
market transparency
market design
JEL: 
D47
D83
L15
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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