Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93908
Authors: 
Ludwig, Sandra
Strassmair, Christina
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 277
Abstract: 
Is free-riding in teams reduced when one member receives a signal on his colleagueís performance? And how does free-riding depend on the signal's type? We address these questions in experimental teams in which two agents sequentially exert effort to contribute to the team output. We vary the type of information the second mover receives prior to his effort choice and find that agents work more when signals are available. Overall, behavior differs from predictions of standard theory. Signals that are predicted to have no effect are, in fact, influential and signals that are predicted to have an effect are redundant.
Subjects: 
Team production
Free-riding
Experiment
Information
Signal
JEL: 
C92
J30
M50
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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