Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93881
Authors: 
Terstiege, Stefan
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 429
Abstract: 
Should contract design induce an agent to conduct a precontractual investigation even though, in any case, the agent will become fully informed after the signing of the contract? This paper shows that imperfect investigations might be encouraged. The result stands in contrast to previous studies, which focus on perfect investigations. The contrast exists because if precontractual investigation is perfect, the benefits of sequential screening vanish.
Subjects: 
Principal agent
information acquisition
sequential screening
JEL: 
D82
D83
D86
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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