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Autoren: 
Gebhardt, Georg
Schmidt, Klaus M.
Datum: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 102
Zusammenfassung: 
When a young entrepreneurial firm matures, it is often necessary to replace the founding entrepreneur by a professional manager. This replacement decision can be affected by the private benefits of control enjoyed by the entrepreneur which gives rise to a conflict of interest between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist. We show that a combination of convertible securities and contingent control rights can be used to resolve this conflict efficiently. This contractual arrangement is frequently observed in venture capital finance.
Schlagwörter: 
Corporate Finance
Venture Capital
Control Rights
Convertible Securities
JEL: 
D23
G24
G32
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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