Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/93863 
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 119
Publisher: 
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), München
Abstract: 
In an interesting recent paper, Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2005) extended Tullock.s (1980) rent-seeking game with an entry decision. The mixed strategies identified by Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi for the case of increasing returns in the contest success function (r > 2) do not constitute an equilibrium of the game they study. However, these strategies are an equilibrium if the strategy space of the game is restricted by a minimum expenditure requirement, and this minimum expenditure requirement is an element of a specific interval.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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