Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/93848 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 428
Verlag: 
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), München
Zusammenfassung: 
The acquisition of information prior to sale gives rise to a hold-up situation quite naturally. Yet, while the bulk of the literature on the hold-up problem considers negotiations under symmetric information where cooperative short-cuts such as split the difference capture the outcome of bargaining, in the present setting, parties negotiate under asymmetric information where the outcome must be derived from a non-cooperative bargaining procedure. To avoid the difficult task of specifying and solving complicated games combining elements of signalling and screening, but to still compare incentives for acquiring information under voluntary versus mandatory disclosure, use of conditions such as incentive, disclosure and participation constraints only is made that are common to all non-cooperative bargaining outcomes.
Schlagwörter: 
mistake
information acquisition
disclosing information
JEL: 
K12
K13
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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