Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93828
Authors: 
Nieken, Petra
Schmitz, Patrick W.
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 372
Abstract: 
This paper reports data from a laboratory experiment on two-period moral hazard problems. The findings corroborate the contract-theoretic insight that even though the periods are technologically unrelated, due to incentive considerations principals can benefit from offering long-term contracts that exhibit memory.
Subjects: 
Repeated moral hazard
Sequential hidden actions
Laboratory experiment
JEL: 
D82
J33
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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