Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93827
Authors: 
Wasser, Cédric
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 331
Abstract: 
We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies.
Subjects: 
contest
imperfectly discriminating
asymmetric information
equilibrium existence
interdependent values
JEL: 
D72
D74
D82
C72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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