Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93826
Authors: 
Kräkel, Matthias
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 286
Abstract: 
We show that incompetitive careers based on individual performance the least productive individuals may have the highest probabilities to be promoted to top positions. These individuals have the lowest fall-back positions and, hence, the highest incentives to succeed in career contests. This detrimental incentive effect exists irrespective of whether effort and talent are substitutes or complements in the underlying contest-success function. However, in case of complements the incentive effect may be be outweighed by a productivity effect that favors high effort choices by the more talented individuals.
Subjects: 
career competition
contest
mediocracy
JEL: 
D72
J44
J45
M51
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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