Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/93818 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 369
Verlag: 
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), München
Zusammenfassung: 
Colluding firms often exchange private information and make transfers within the cartels based on the information. Estimating the impact of such collusive practices'€” known as the 'lysine strategy profile (LSP)€'€” on cartel duration is difficult because of endogeneity and omitted variable bias. I use firms' linguistic differences as an instrumental variable for the LSP in 135 cartels discovered by the European Commission since 1980. The incidence of the LSP is not significantly related to cartel duration. After correction for selectivity in the decision to use the LSP, statistical tests are consistent with a theoretic prediction that the LSP increases cartel duration.
Schlagwörter: 
the lysine strategy profile
post-agreement information exchange
within-cartel transfers
monitoring
verification and promotion of compliance
cartel duration
endogenous covariates
JEL: 
D43
K21
K42
L13
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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