Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93818
Authors: 
Zhou, Jun
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 369
Abstract: 
Colluding firms often exchange private information and make transfers within the cartels based on the information. Estimating the impact of such collusive practices'€” known as the 'lysine strategy profile (LSP)€'€” on cartel duration is difficult because of endogeneity and omitted variable bias. I use firms' linguistic differences as an instrumental variable for the LSP in 135 cartels discovered by the European Commission since 1980. The incidence of the LSP is not significantly related to cartel duration. After correction for selectivity in the decision to use the LSP, statistical tests are consistent with a theoretic prediction that the LSP increases cartel duration.
Subjects: 
the lysine strategy profile
post-agreement information exchange
within-cartel transfers
monitoring
verification and promotion of compliance
cartel duration
endogenous covariates
JEL: 
D43
K21
K42
L13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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