Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93798
Authors: 
Bester, Helmut
Wärneryd, Karl
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 94
Abstract: 
We consider social contracts for resolving conflicts between two agents who are uncertain about each other's fighting potential. Applications include international conflict, litigation, and elections. Even though only a peaceful agreement avoids a loss of resources, if this loss is small enough, then any contract must assign a positive probability of conflict. We show how the likelihood of conflict outbreak depends on the distribution of power between the agents and their information about each other.
Subjects: 
conflict
social contracts
asymmetric information
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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