Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93796
Authors: 
Kräkel, Matthias
Schöttner, Anja
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 264
Abstract: 
It is well-known that, in static models, minimum wages generate positive worker rents and, consequently, inefficiently low e?ort. We show that this result does not necessarily extend to a dynamic context. The reason is that, in repeated employment relationships, ?rms may exploit workers' future rents to induce excessively high effort.
Subjects: 
bonuses
limited liability
minimum wages
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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