Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/93793 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 128
Verlag: 
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), München
Zusammenfassung: 
Zheng has proposed a seller-optimal auction for (asymmetric) independent-privatevalue environments where inter-bidder resale is possible. Zheng's construction requires novel conditions '€” Resale Monotonicity, Transitivity, and Invariance '€” on the bidders' value distribution profile. The only known examples of distribution profiles satisfying these conditions in environments with three or more bidders are uniform distributions. Our characterization result shows that Zheng's conditions, while being strong, are satisfied by many non-uniform distribution profiles. A crucial step in our analysis is to show that Invariance implies Resale Monotonicity and Transitivity.
Schlagwörter: 
independent private values
optimal auction
resale
inverse virtual valuation function
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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