Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93769
Authors: 
Kranz, Sebastian
Ohlendorf, Susanne
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 259
Abstract: 
We study infinitely repeated two player games with perfect information, where each period consists of two stages: one in which the parties simultaneously choose an action and one in which they can transfer money to each other. We first derive simple conditions that allow a constructive characterization of all Pareto-optimal subgame perfect payoffs for all discount factors. Afterwards, we examine different concepts of renegotiation-proofness and extend the characterization to renegotiation-proof payoffs.
Subjects: 
renegotiation
infinitely repeated games
side payments
optimal penal codes
JEL: 
C73
L14
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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