Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93758
Authors: 
Apestgeguia, Jose
Huck, Steffen
Oechssler, Jörg
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 54
Abstract: 
We introduce a generalized theoretical approach to study imitation and subject it to rigorous experimental testing. In our theoretical analysis we find that the different predictions of previous imitation models are due to different informational assumptions, not to different behavioral rules. It is more important whom one imitates rather than how. In a laboratory experiment we test the different theories by systematically varying information conditions. We find significant effects of seemingly innocent changes in information. Moreover, the generalized imitation model predicts the differences between treatments well. The data provide support for imitation on the individual level, both in terms of choice and in terms of perception. But imitation is not unconditional. Rather individuals' propensity to imitate more successful actions is increasing in payoff differences.
Subjects: 
Evolutionary game theory
Stochastic stability
Imitation
Cournot markets
Information
Experiments
Simulations
JEL: 
C72
C91
C92
D43
L13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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