Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/93756 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 226
Verlag: 
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), München
Zusammenfassung: 
If a seller delivers a good non-conforming to contract, European and US warranty law allows consumers to choose between some money transfer and termination. Termination rights are, however, widely criticized, mainly for fear that the buyer may use non-conformity as a pretext for getting rid of a contract he no longer wants. We show that this possibility of 'opportunistic termination' might actually have positive effects. Under some circumstances, it will lead to redistribution in favour of the buyer without any loss of efficiency. Moreover, by curbing the monopoly power of the seller, a regime involving termination might increase welfare by enabling a more efficient output level in a setting with multiple buyers.
Schlagwörter: 
contract law
warranties
breach remedies
termination
harmonization
JEL: 
K12
C7
L40
D30
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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