Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93521
Authors: 
Neuenkirch, Matthias
Neumeier, Florian
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics 36-2013
Abstract: 
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between certain characteristics of incumbent central bank governors and their interest-rate-setting behavior. We focus on (i) occupational backgrounds, (ii) party affiliation, and (iii) experience in office and estimate augmented Taylor rules for 20 OECD countries and the period 1974-2008. Our findings are as follows. First, the tenures of central bank governors who are affiliated with a political party are characterized by a relatively dovish monetary policy stance, irrespective of their partisan ideology. Second, party affiliation appears to be more important than occupational background, i.e., all bankers with(out) a party affiliation behave very similarly to each regardless of their specific occupational background. Third, party members react significantly less to inflation and more to output the longer they stay in office.
Subjects: 
Central Bank Governors
Monetary Policy
Occupation
Partisanship
Taylor Rules
JEL: 
E31
E43
E52
E58
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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