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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 26-2013
Verlag: 
Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Marburg
Zusammenfassung: 
With the help of a real effort experiment, we analyze if tax evasion depends on the amount of effort invested to generate income. In three treatments, subjects were either endowed with income or had to work moderately or hard to earn it. In line with prospect theory, subjects evaded more taxes when they worked hard for their income. We find little evidence for the prediction that tax evasion in the endowed treatment is higher than in the moderate work treatment.
Schlagwörter: 
tax evasion
prospect theory
house money effect
sunk cost effect
real effort experiment
JEL: 
C91
D03
H26
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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