Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93425
Authors: 
Barrett, Scott
Dannenberg, Astrid
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 4643
Abstract: 
Previous research shows that collective action to avoid a catastrophic threshold, such as a climate “tipping point,” is unaffected by uncertainty about the impact of crossing the threshold but that collective action collapses if the location of the threshold is uncertain. Theory suggests that behavior should differ dramatically either side of a dividing line for threshold uncertainty. Inside the dividing line, where uncertainty is small, collective action should succeed. Outside the dividing line, where uncertainty is large, collective action should fail. We test this prediction in the experimental lab. Our results strongly support the prediction: behavior is highly sensitive to uncertainty around the dividing line.
Subjects: 
collective action
prisoners' dilemma
coordination game
threshold uncertainty
negotiations
tipping points
climate change
experimental economics
JEL: 
C72
F51
H41
H87
Q54
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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