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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 4588
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze the redistributive (dis)advantages of a minimum wage over income taxation in competitive labor markets. A minimum wage causes more unemployment, but also leads to more skill formation as unemployment is concentrated on low-skilled workers. A simple condition based on three sufficient statistics shows that a minimum wage is desirable if the social welfare gains of more skill formation outweigh the social welfare losses of increased unemployment. Using a highly conservative calibration, a minimum wage decrease is shown to be part of a Pareto-improving policy reform for all countries under consideration, except possibly the United States.
Schlagwörter: 
minimum wage
optimal redistribution
unemployment
education
JEL: 
D60
H21
H24
J21
J24
J38
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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