Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/93393 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 4608
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
Under tenancy rent control, rents are regulated within a tenancy but not between tenancies. This paper investigates the effects of tenancy rent control on housing quality and maintenance. Since the discounted revenue received over a fixed-duration tenancy depends only on the starting rent, intuitively the landlord has an incentive to spruce up the unit between tenancies in order to “show” it well, but little incentive to maintain the unit well during the tenancy. The paper formalizes this intuition and presents numerical examples illustrating the efficiency loss from this effect.
Subjects: 
tenancy rent control
rent control
maintenance
housing quality
credible commitment
JEL: 
R21
R31
R38
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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