Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93392
Authors: 
Doepke, Matthias
Tertilt, Michèle
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 4661
Abstract: 
Empirical evidence suggests that money in the hands of mothers (as opposed to fathers) increases expenditures on children. From this, should we infer that targeting transfers to women is good economic policy? In this paper, we develop a non-cooperative model of household decision making to answer this question. We show that when women have lower wages than men, they may spend more on children, even when they have exactly the same preferences as their husbands. However, this does not necessarily mean that giving money to women is a good development policy. We show that depending on the nature of the production function, targeting transfers to women may be beneficial or harmful to growth. In particular, such transfers are more likely to be beneficial when human capital, rather than physical capital or land, is the most important factor of production.
Subjects: 
female empowerment
gender equality
development
theory of the household
JEL: 
D13
J16
O10
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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