Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/93379 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
WZB Discussion Paper No. SP II 2014-201
Verlag: 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider the problem of allocating several types of indivisible goods when preferences are separable and monetary transfers are not allowed. Our finding is that the coordinatewise application of strategy-proof and non-wasteful rules yields a strategy-proof rule with the following efficiency property: no strategy-proof rule Pareto-dominates the rule. Such rules are abundant as they include the coordinate-wise use of the two well-known priority-based rules of the top trading cycles (TTC) and the deferred acceptance (DA). Moreover, our result supports the current practice in Market Design that separately treats each type of market for its design.
Schlagwörter: 
strategy-proofness
second-best incentive compatibility
top trading cycles rules
deferred acceptance rules
JEL: 
C78
D47
D71
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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