Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93379
Authors: 
Anno, Hidekazu
Kurino, Morimitsu
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2014-201
Abstract: 
We consider the problem of allocating several types of indivisible goods when preferences are separable and monetary transfers are not allowed. Our finding is that the coordinatewise application of strategy-proof and non-wasteful rules yields a strategy-proof rule with the following efficiency property: no strategy-proof rule Pareto-dominates the rule. Such rules are abundant as they include the coordinate-wise use of the two well-known priority-based rules of the top trading cycles (TTC) and the deferred acceptance (DA). Moreover, our result supports the current practice in Market Design that separately treats each type of market for its design.
Subjects: 
strategy-proofness
second-best incentive compatibility
top trading cycles rules
deferred acceptance rules
JEL: 
C78
D47
D71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
645.04 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.