Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93110
Authors: 
Bolle, Friedel
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper, European University Viadrina, Department of Business Administration and Economics 345
Abstract: 
The launch of a public project requires support from enough members of a group. Members (players) are differently important for the project and have different cost/benefit relations. There are players who profit and players who suffer from the launch of the project. Examples are the Kyoto protocol, voting with different weights (shareholders, the UN with the veto power of the Security Council members), and international scientific or military expeditions. As coordination on one of the usually many pure strategy equilibria is difficult, mixed strategy equilibria are the focus of this investigation. If all players profit from the launch of the project then, despite the unnecessary costs, the requirement of full contributions is a Pareto-improvement to every original threshold. The contribution probabilities of some player types defined by their importance are characterized according to their cost/benefit relations.
Subjects: 
Threshold Public Goods
Provision Point Mechanism
Voting
JEL: 
D72
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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