Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93082
Authors: 
Doerrenberg, Philipp
Duncan, Denvil
Zeppenfeld, Christopher
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers 14-014
Abstract: 
This paper examines whether risk-taking in a lottery depends on the opportunity to respond to the lottery outcome through additional labor effort and/or tax evasion. Previous empirical attempts to answer this question face identification issues due to self selection into jobs that facilitate tax evasion and labor effort exibility. We address these identification issues using a laboratory experiment (N = 180). Subjects have the opportunity to invest earned income in a lottery and, depending on randomly assigned treatment states, have the opportunity to respond to the lottery outcome through evasion and/or extra labor effort. We find strong evidence that ex-post access to labor opportunities reduces ex-ante risk willingness while access to tax evasion has no effect on risk behavior. We discuss possible explanations for this result based on the existing literature.
Subjects: 
Tax Evasion
Labor Supply
Risk Behavior
Lab Experiment
JEL: 
G11
H21
H24
H26
J22
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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