Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92890
Authors: 
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 648
Abstract: 
We consider situations where a society allocates a finite units of an indivisible good among agents, and each agent receives at most one unit of the good. For example, imagine that a government allocates a fixed number of licences to private firms, or imagine that a government distributes equally divided lands to households. We show that the Vickrey allocation rule is the unique allocation rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity and individual rationality.
Subjects: 
strategy-proofness
anonymity
indivisible good
Vickrey allocation rule
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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