Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92870
Authors: 
Hatsumi, Kentaro
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 735
Abstract: 
We consider the election model in which voters choose a subset from the set of candidates. Both voters and candidates are assumed to possess preferences with separable strict orderings. We investigate a rule satisfying candidate stability, which is the requirement to deter any candidate from strategic withdrawal. We show that a rule satisfies candidate stability if and only if it satisfies independence of the selection for each candidate.
Subjects: 
multiple-winner election
strategic candidacy
separable preference
voting by committees
JEL: 
D71
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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