Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92867
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 790
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider a two good world where an individual i with income mi has utility function u (x, y), where x element of [0, ∞) and y element of {0, 1}. We first derive the valuation (maximum price that he is willing to pay for the object) for good y as a function of his income. Then we consider the following problem. Suppose good x is available in a store at a fixed price 1. Good y can be obtained in an auction. In such a situation we show that bidding ones own valuation is an equilibrium in a second-price auction. With risk neutral bidders and high enough incomes we derive the symmetric equilibrium in first-price and all-pay auctions and show that revenue equivalence fails to hold. With risk neutrality we also show that under mild restrictions, the revenue maximising reserve price is zero for all the three auctions and the all-pay auction with zero reserve price fetches the highest expected revenue. With low enough incomes, we show that under some restrictions, bidding ones own valuation is a symmetric equilibrium even for first-price and all-pay auctions. Here also, the expected revenue is the highest with all-pay auctions.
JEL: 
D44
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
331.6 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.