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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 849
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze the optimal reserve price in a second price auction when there are N types of bidders whose valuations are drawn from different distribution functions. The seller cannot determine the specific type of each bidder. First, we show that the number of bidders affects the reserve price. Second, we give the sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the optimal reserve price. Third, we find that if a bidder is replaced by a stronger bidder, the optimal reserve price may decrease. Finally, we give sufficient conditions that ensure the seller will not use a reserve price; hence, the auction will be efficient.
Schlagwörter: 
Auction
Reserve (Reservation) Price
Asymmetric Bidders
JEL: 
D44
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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