Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92835
Authors: 
Kawasaki, Akio
Lin, Ming Hsin
Matsushima, Noriaki
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 796
Abstract: 
We investigate a multi-market Cournot model with strategic process R&D investments wherein a multi-market monopolist meets entrants that enter one of the markets. We find that entry can enhance the total R&D expenditure of the incumbent firm. That is, entry can stimulate R&D effort. Moreover, the incumbent's profit nonmonotonically changes as the number of entrants increases. Depending on the fixed entry costs and R&D technologies, both insufficient and excess entry can appear.
Subjects: 
multi-market
oligopoly
process R&D
entry
welfare
JEL: 
L13
O32
L11
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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