Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/92826 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 848
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
We characterize the optimal bidding strategies of local and global bidders for two heterogenous licenses in a multi-unit simultaneous ascending auction. The global bidder wants to win both licenses to enjoy synergies; therefore, she bids more than her stand-alone valuation of a license. This exposes her to the risk of losing money even when she wins all licenses. We determine the optimal bidding strategies in the presence of an exposure problem. By using simulation methods, firstt, we show the frequency of inefficient allocation in the simultaneous ascending auction. Then, we show that the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism may generate more revenue than the simultaneous ascending auction.
Schlagwörter: 
Multi-Unit Auctions
Vickrey Clarke Groves (VCG) mechanism
Exposure Problem
Synergies
Complementarity
JEL: 
D44
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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