Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92821
Authors: 
Fujinaka, Yuji
Wakayama, Takuma
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 727
Abstract: 
This paper considers the object allocation problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). We study secure implementation (Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2007), that is, double implementation in dominant strategy and Nash equilibria. We prove that (i) an individually rational solution is securely implementable if and only if it is the no-trade solution, (ii) a neutral solution is securely implementable if and only if it is a serial dictatorship, and (iii) an efficient solution is securely implementable if and only if it is a sequential dictatorship. Furthermore, we provide a complete characterization of securely implementable solutions in the two-agent case.
Subjects: 
Secure implementation
Sequential dictatorship
Strict core
Strategyproofness
Shapley-Scarf housing markets
JEL: 
C72
C78
D61
D63
D71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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