Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92813
Authors: 
Hatsumi, Kentaro
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 686
Abstract: 
We consider the allotment problems of homogeneous indivisible objects among agents with single-peaked and risk-averse von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility functions. We establish that the rule satisfies coalitional strategy-proofness, same-sideness, and strong symmetry if and only if it is the uniform probabilistic rule. By constructing an example, we show that if same-sideness is replaced by respect for unanimity, the statement does not hold even with additional requirements of peaks-onlyness and continuity.
Subjects: 
coalitional strategy-proofness
homogeneous indivisible objects
single-peakedness
risk-averseness
uniform probabilistic rule
JEL: 
C72
D71
D81
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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