Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/92793 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 770
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
We provide a simple model to investigate decisions on vertical integration/separation. The key feature of this model is that more than one input is required for the final products of the local downstream monopolists. Depending on their cost structure, downstream firms' decisions on vertical separation can be both strategic complements and strategic substitutes. As a result, the equilibrium number of vertically integrated firms depends on the cost structure. When the local downstream monopolists merge, vertical separation tends to appear in equilibrium. When an upstream firm can price discriminate, the downstream firms vertically separate. When the downstream firms compete with each other, vertical integration tends to appear if the degree of product differentiation is lower.
Schlagwörter: 
vertical integration
vertical separation
local monopolists
inputs
technology
JEL: 
D43
L13
L22
M11
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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