Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92785
Authors: 
Arato, Hiroki
Hori, Takeo
Nakamura, Tomoya
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 892
Abstract: 
We extend the model of Cornand and Heinemann (2008, Economic Journal) and examine how to implement partial announcement by selling public information when the agents' action is strategic complements. In a game of information acquisition, there exist multiple equilibria and the partial announcement equilibrium is unstable if the authorities sell public information at a constant price. However, if the authorities offer an increasing pricing rule, partial announcement equilibrium is stable and implementable.
Subjects: 
Beauty contest games
Transparency of information
Partial announcement policy
JEL: 
C73
D82
D83
E5
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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